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Abstract
We introduce public spending, financed through income taxation, in the Ramsey model
with heterogeneous agents. Public spending as a source of welfare generates more com-
plex dynamics. In contrast to previous contributions focusing on similar models but with
wasteful public spending, limit cycles through Hopf bifurcation and expectation-driven
fluctuations appear if the degree of capital-labor substitution is large enough to be compat-
ible with capital income monotonicity. Moreover, unlike frameworks with a representative
agent, our results do not require externalities in production and are compatible with a
weakly elastic labor supply with respect to wage.
JEL classification: C62, E32, H23.
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1 Introduction
The Ramsey (1928) model is one of the most popular frameworks to analyze macroeco-
nomic dynamics. As it is well-known, when there is one representative agent, one sector
and usual assumptions (constant returns to scale, concave utility function, constant dis-
count factor), the economy monotonically converges to the steady state.
With many agents, conclusions may differ. Introducing borrowing constraints, Becker
(1980) shows the so-called Ramsey conjecture, i.e. the most patient agent holds the
whole capital stock in the long run. Most importantly for our purpose, dynamics can
be non-monotonic and endogenous cycles can occur around this steady state. As shown
by Becker and Foias (1987, 1994), this requires the non-monotonicity of capital income:
the capital income has to decrease with respect to capital, i.e. the inputs are sufficiently
low substitutes. When labor supply is elastic, this conclusion can be slightly relaxed
(Bosi and Seegmuller (2010a)), but endogenous cycles still require a sufficiently weak
elasticity of capital-labor substitution. In these contributions, cycles have period two and
expectation-driven fluctuations cannot occur.
Introducing public spending financed through a balanced-budget rule in the Ramsey
model with many agents, indeterminacy, and therefore sunspot fluctuations can arise.
This has been investigated by Bosi and Seegmuller (2010b), considering wasteful govern-
ment expenditures and progressive taxation on capital and labor incomes.1 Their paper
emphasises that the multiplicity of equilibria is mainly explained by the intertemporal
choice of the most patient agent when affected by non-linear capital taxation. However,
1A similar result is obtained by Sorger (2002) in a model with progressive taxation, but without
endogenous labor.
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endogenous fluctuations still require a low elasticity of capital-labor substitution, meaning
again the non-monotonicity of capital income, which can be criticized from an empirical
point of view,2 and still occur through a flip bifurcation and period-two cycles. It is
worth pointing out that, under certain circumstances, this is likely to provide unsatisfac-
tory empirical properties, such that negative auto-correlations of the main variables. This
is typically the case, for instance, when the flip bifurcation is subcritical and the model is
evaluated while a 2-period cycle surrounds the steady-state.
In this paper we still focus on government intervention as a source of expectation-
driven fluctuations. But contrary to Bosi and Seegmuller (2010b), we consider that public
spending is useful as it improves households’ utility of consumption as an externality. In
such a framework, we will show that even with linear taxation, the intertemporal choices
of the most patient household are affected in such a way that sunspot fluctuations become
compatible with capital income monotonicity, meaning plausible values of the elasticity
of capital-labor substitution. The public spending externality is the main ingredient
explaining endogenous business cycles.3 Indeed, following an optimistic expectation, the
2To fix ideas, non-monotonicity of capital income is obtained when the elasticity of capital-labor
substitution σ is lower than the expression (1−s)[1−β1(1−δ)], with s the share of capital in total income,
β1 the discount factor of the most patient agent and δ the depreciation rate of capital. Considering that
at quarterly frequencies s = 0.3, β1 = 0.99 and δ = 0.025, we get σ < 0.0243. Such a restriction is
not compatible with all the recent estimates of the elasticity of substitution. For instance, Duffy and
Papageorgiou [10] report robust estimates that are contained in [1.24, 3.24]. On the contrary, León-
Ledesma et al. [18] provide robust estimates in the range [0.4, 0.6].
3Lloyd-Braga et al. (2008) also show that public spending can be a source of endogenous fluctuations
when there are heterogeneous households. The Woodford (1986) framework considered is however differ-
ent, since the results apply to a monetary equilibrium with an infinitely elastic labor supply with respect
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increase of investment generates two effects: on the one hand, the implied increase of the
marginal rate of intertemporal substitution in consumption is mitigated by the presence
of public spending externalities. On the other hand, these externalities also generate a
more than porportional increase of the labor supply with respect to capital, implying a
decrease of the capital-labor ratio and thus a higher interest rate. These two effects are
then compatible with the Euler equation and expectations are self-fulfilling.
It is also worthwhile to note that endogenous deterministic fluctuations now emerge
not only through a flip bifurcation (Guo and Harrison (2008)) but also through a Hopf
bifurcation. As emphasized in Dufourt et al. [12], the two-dimensional dynamical sys-
tem that describes the intertemporal equilibrium is then much more likely to provide a
satisfactory account of observed business cycles (characterized by persistent fluctuations,
positive auto-correlations and, usually, non-monotonic dynamics of convergence to the
steady-state) since, close to a Hopf bifurcation, the eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix
evaluated at the steady-state are complex conjugates with a modulus close to one.
In this framework, we also emphasize the crucial role played by the endogenous labor
supply which has to be elastic with respect to public spending,4 but can be weakly elastic
with respect to the wage rate. This last property appears to be in accordance with the
empirical evidence.5 We note that this is in contrast to models with public spending ex-
to the wage.
4Note that in our framework, public spending externalities can be seen as a distortion on the labor
market. See also Dufourt et al. (2008) and Grandmont (2008) where distortions on the labor market,
such that unemployment benefits, unions or efficiency wages, also generate local indeterminacy under
plausible values of parameters.
5At the microeconomic level, most econometric analysis available in the literature conclude that the
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ternalities and a representative consumer where an infinitely elastic labor supply is often
assumed (see for instance Guo and Harrison (2008)). Another important difference with
respect to the previous literature is that in our framework with heterogeneous house-
holds, deterministic cycles occur without requiring externalities and increasing returns in
production (see for instance Zhang (2000)).
This paper is organized as follows. The model is presented in the next section. Section
3 is devoted to the steady state analysis. In Section 4, we study the occurrence of en-
dogenous business cycles. Section 5 provides some economic intuitions, while concluding
remarks appear in Section 6. Proofs and technical details are provided in the Appendix.
2 The model
We consider a discrete time economy (t = 0, 1, ...,∞), with three types of agents, house-
holds, firms and a government.
2.1 Households
There are H heterogeneous infinitely lived households, indexed by i = 1, . . . , H, who
supply elastically labor and face borrowing constraints. They have heterogeneous cap-
ital endowments (ki0 > 0) and preferences, i.e. different discount factors and different
wage elasticity of labor belongs to (0, 0.5) for men and to (0.5, 1) for women (see Blundell and MaCurdy
[6]). On the contrary, Rogerson and Wallenius [27] have shown that, due to the role of the participation
decision of women and the extent of early retirement, the elasticities at the macroeconomic level are
virtually unrelated to the micro elasticities. The macroeconomic elasticity of the labor supply with
respect to the wage appears to be in the range of (2.25, 3.0). In both cases, the elasticity is not too large.
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instantaneous utilities in consumption and leisure. To fix ideas, households are ranked
according to their discount factors: 0 ≤ βH ≤ . . . ≤ β2 < β1 < 1.
Consumer i has separable preferences over time, and between consumption and leisure.
Moreover, we assume that public spending Gt affects welfare, as an externality on utility
for consumption.6 Denoting cit his consumption and lit his labor supply at period t,
consumer i’s utility function is given by:
+∞∑
t=0
βti [ui (cit, Gt)− vi (lit)] (1)
Denote rt the real interest rate, wt the real wage, δ ∈ (0, 1) the depreciation rate of
capital and τ ∈ (0, 1) the constant tax rate on income. Each household maximizes (1)
facing the budget constraint:
cit + kit+1 − (1− δ)kit = (1− τ)(rtkit + wtlit), (2)
the borrowing constraint on individual capital holding kit ≥ 0 and the constraint on labor
lit ∈ [0, ¯`], with ¯` the endowment of labor. The utility function satisfies the following
assumption:
Assumption 1. ui (ci, G) and vi (li) are continuous functions defined on [0,+∞) ×
[0,+∞) and [0, ¯`], and C2 on (0,+∞) × (0,+∞) and (0, 1), respectively. ui (ci, G) is
strictly increasing (uic (ci, G) > 0) and strictly concave (uicc (ci, G) < 0) with respect to
6One could also introduce a public spending externality in the disutility of labor. Since we will focus on
equilibria where the most patient household supplies no labor, it would not alter his behavior. This would
only affect the relationship between labor supply and public spending coming from impatient households’
behavior (i = 2, ...,H). This link would be reinforced if the marginal disutility of labor decreases with
the public spending externality, and dampened otherwise.
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its first argument.7 vi (li) is strictly increasing (v′i (li) > 0) and convex (v′′i (li) > 0). In
addition, the Inada conditions limci→0 ui1 (ci, G) = +∞, limli→¯`v′i (li) = +∞ are satisfied.
Utility maximization gives:
uic (cit, Gt) (1− τ)wt ≤ v′i (lit) , with equality when lit > 0 (3)
uic (cit, Gt)
uic (cit+1, Gt+1)
≥ βiRt+1, with equality when kit+1 > 0 (4)
withRt+1 = 1−δ+(1−τ)rt+1 and the transversality condition lim
t→+∞
βtiuic (cit, Gt) kit+1 = 0.
For all i = 1, . . . , H, cit and lit are forward variables while kit are predetermined variables.
For further reference, we introduce the following elasticities:8
icc ≡ −uiccci/uic > 0, icG ≡ uicGG/uic, ill ≡ v′′i li/v′i > 0 (5)
2.2 Firms
A representative firm produces the final good yt, using a technology with constant returns
yt = F (kt, lt) = f (at) lt, where kt denotes capital, lt labor and at ≡ kt/lt. The intensive
production function f (a) satisfies:
Assumption 2. f (a) is a continuous function defined on [0,+∞) and C2 on (0,+∞),
strictly increasing (f ′ (a) > 0) and strictly concave (f ′′ (a) < 0). In addition, the con-
ditions lima→0 f ′ (a) = +∞ and lima→+∞ f ′ (a) < θ/(β1(1 − τ)) are satisfied, where
θ ≡ 1− β1(1− δ).
Profit maximization gives:
rt = f
′ (at) ≡ r (at) and wt = f (at)− atf ′ (at) ≡ w (at) (6)
Due to constant returns to scale and perfect competition, profits are zero, i.e.,
7We denote uixj (x1, x2) = ∂ui(x1, x2)/∂xj and uixjxh(x1, x2) = ∂2ui(x1, x2)/∂xj∂xh.
8For simplicity, we omit the arguments of the functions.
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f(at)lt = wtlt + rtkt (7)
In the following, we denote by s (a) ≡ af ′ (a) /f (a) ∈ (0, 1) the capital share in total
income and σ (a) ≡ [s (a)− 1] f ′ (a) / [af ′′ (a)] ≥ 0 the elasticity of capital-labor substitu-
tion. We derive the following useful relationships:
r′(a)a/r(a) ≡ −(1− s(a))/σ(a) and w′(a)a/w(a) ≡ s(a)/σ(a) (8)
2.3 Government
Public spending Gt is financed by income taxation, through a balanced-budget rule:
Gt = τ
H∑
i=1
(rtkit + wtlit) (9)
where τ ∈ (0, 1) is the constant proportional tax rate on households’ income.
2.4 Intertemporal equilibrium
An intertemporal equilibrium can be defined as follows:
Definition 1. Under Assumptions 1 and 2, an equilibrium of the economy E =(
f, τ, (ki0, βi, ui, vi)
H
i=1
)
is a sequence (rt, wt, kt, lt, Gt, (kit, lit, cit)
H
i=1)
+∞
t=0 satisfying the fol-
lowing conditions:
(D1) kt > 0, lt > 0, kit ≥ 0, 0 ≤ lit < ¯`, cit > 0;9
(D2) rt = f ′ (at) ≡ r (at) and wt = f (at)− atf ′ (at) ≡ w (at), with at = kt/lt;
(D3) uic (cit, Gt) (1− τ)wt ≤ v′i (lit), with equality when lit > 0;
(D4) uic (cit, Gt) ≥ βiRt+1uic (cit+1, Gt+1), with equality when kit+1 > 0, and Rt+1 ≡
R(at+1) = 1− δ + (1− τ)r(at+1);
(D5) cit + kit+1 − (1− δ)kit = (1− τ)(rtkit + wtlit);
9Assumption 1 rules out any equilibrium with cit = 0 or lit = ¯`.
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(D6) kt =
∑H
i=1 kit;
(D7) lt =
∑H
i=1 lit;
(D8) Gt = τ
∑H
i=1(rtkit + wtlit);
and the transversality condition limt→+∞ βtiuic (cit, Gt) kit+1 = 0, for i = 1, ...H.
The existence of the intertemporal equilibrium is an issue that we do not address in
this paper. The interested reader can refer to Becker et al. (1991), Bosi and Seegmuller
(2010a) or Becker et al. (2012). In the next section, we show the existence of a steady
state. Since we focus on local dynamics around such an equilibrium, we consider that, by
continuity, an intertemporal equilibrium exists in a neighborhood of the steady state.
3 Steady state analysis
Since the tax rate on income is constant, the most patient household holds all the capital
stock at the steady state (Becker (1980)). Moreover, two types of steady states may
exist, depending on whether the most patient household supplies labor or not (Bosi and
Seegmuller (2010a)).
Proposition 1. Under Assumptions 1 and 2, there exists a steady state defined by the
following properties:
(S1) r = f ′(a), w = f(a)− af ′(a) and R = 1− δ + (1− τ)r are constant;
(S2) R = 1/β1 < 1/β2 ≤ . . . ≤ 1/βH ;
(S3) k = k1 > 0 and ki = 0 for i ≥ 2;
(S4) u1c (c1, G) (1− τ)w ≤ v′1 (l1) and, for i ≥ 2, uic (ci, G) (1− τ)w = v′i (li);
(S5) c1 = (R− 1) k1 + (1− τ)wl1 and ci = (1− τ)wli for i ≥ 2;
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(S6) l =
∑H
i=1 li;
(S7) G = τ(rk1 +
∑H
i=1wli) = τf(k1/l)l.
Proof. See Appendix 7.1.
This proposition shows that because of the borrowing constraints, there exists a steady
state. In accordance with the Ramsey (1928) conjecture and the seminal contribution of
Becker (1980), the most patient household holds the whole capital stock. In contrast, in
the absence of borrowing constraint, no steady state would exist (Le Van and Vailakis
(2003), Le Van et al. (2007)). In this case indeed, the impatient agents reduce their
consumption and increase their labor through time to reimburse their debt.
It is important to note that Proposition 1 suggests the existence of two types of steady
state, one where the most patient household supplies no labor (l1 = 0) and one where all
households are working (0 < l1 < ¯`). Indeed, since the most patient household, namely
the capitalist, holds all the capital, he may choose not to work and share his after tax
capital income between consumption and capital accumulation.
As already noticed by Bosi and Seegmuller (2010a), the steady state where the patient
agent supplies no labor is undoubtedly of interest. In this case, two social classes emerge:
the capitalist who smooths consumption on his infinite horizon and invests in productive
capital, and H − 1 workers who consume at each period their after-tax labor income.
This property then provides foundations to models with population segmentation such as
Mankiw (2000), Michel and Pestieau (1999) and Woodford (1986). In the following we
focus exclusively on this type of steady state.
As preliminaries, let us define some useful elasticities. Households make their labor
choice taking the prices w and r as given. Recall that the labor supply of impatient
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agents, i = 2, ..., H, is defined by:
uic((1− τ)wli, G)(1− τ)w = v′i(li) (10)
Using Assumption 1, this implicitly defines li = li(w,G), where:
liG ≡
dli/li
dG/G
=
icG
ill + icc
, liw ≡
dli/li
dw/w
=
1− icc
ill + icc
∈ (−1,+∞) (11)
Using λi ≡ li/l ∈ (0, 1), we denote lG ≡
∑H
i=2 λiliG and lw ≡
∑H
i=2 λiliw ∈ (−1,+∞).
We then derive the following existence result:
Corollary 1. Let Assumptions 1 and 2 hold, θ ≡ 1 − β1(1 − δ), a be the solution of
r(a) = θ/(β1(1 − τ)), and c1(l1) and l(l1) be the capitalist’s consumption and aggregate
labor supply as functions of l1.10 There exists a steady state where the capitalist supplies
no labor (l1 = 0) if and only if
v′1 (0) > u1c [c1(0), τf(a)l(0)] (1− τ)w (12)
Proof. See Appendix 7.2.
If the capitalist’s marginal disutility of labor is sufficiently large with respect to the
marginal utility of consumption, he chooses not to work. The larger the capital stock at
the steady state, the larger the capitalist’s consumption, the lower his marginal utility of
consumption and thus the more likely this case is. However, this effect can be mitigated by
the public spending externality, if it positively affects the marginal utility of consumption.
Indeed, a larger capital stock is associated with a higher total labor supply and may thus
generate a larger capitalist’s marginal utility of consumption. In the next section, we
focus on the analysis of the equilibrium dynamics in the neighborhood of such a steady
state.
10See Appendix 7.2 for formal definitions.
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4 Endogenous business cycles under public spending
externalities
Our aim is to show that, since public spending externalities affect utility of consump-
tion, endogenous business cycles and expectation-driven fluctuations occur in the Ram-
sey model with heterogeneous agents when the capital-labor substitution is large enough.
Such a conclusion is at odds with previous contributions studying this type of model
(Becker and Foias (1987, 1994), Bosi and Seegmuller (2010a,b)). Moreover, it is worth
pointing out that our results are obtained without introducing productive externalities
and are compatible with a small elasticity of labor with respect to the wage rate.
As we focus on dynamics around the steady state without capitalist’s labor supply
(l1 = 0), we assume in the following that inequality (12) holds (see Corollary 1). To
analyze the stability properties and the occurrence of endogenous cycles, we start by
defining some additional useful elasticities, all evaluated at the steady state.
Taking into account that wt = w(kt/lt) and Gt = τf(kt/lt)lt, the aggregate labor
supply is given by:
lt =
H∑
i=2
li (w (kt/lt) , τf(kt/lt)lt) (13)
This expression implicitly defines lt = l (kt), where l′(k)k/l(k) ≡ lk is given by:
lk =
lws/σ + lGs
1 + lws/σ − lG(1− s) (14)
as long as 1 + lws/σ − lG(1− s) 6= 0.
Using this result, in the neighborhood of the steady state exhibited in Corollary 1,
the intertemporal equilibrium can be summarized by a two-dimensional dynamical system
given by the patient household’s trade-off between present and future consumption and
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his budget constraint.11 Indeed, using (10), (D8), (D7), (D6) and (13), an intertemporal
equilibrium can be redefined as a sequence (c1t, kt)
∞
t=0, satisfying:
u1c [c1t, τf(kt/l(kt))l(kt)]
u1c [c1t+1, τf(kt+1/l(kt+1))l(kt+1)]
= β1R (kt+1/l(kt+1)) (15)
kt+1 = R (kt/l(kt)) kt − c1t (16)
where l(kt) is defined by (13), c1t is a forward variable and kt is the only predetermined
variable.
We characterize the stability properties of the steady state and the occurrence of
local bifurcations by linearizing the dynamic system (15)-(16) around the steady state
(c1, k) and computing the Jacobian matrix J , evaluated at this steady state. Following
Grandmont et al. (1998), we compute the trace T and the determinantD of the associated
Jacobian matrix J and study the stability properties by locating them in the (T,D)-plane
(see Figures 1-2).
Lemma 1. Under Assumptions 1 and 2, the characteristic polynomial is given by P (x) ≡
x2 − Tx+D = 0, where:
T = 1 +
1
β1
+ θ(1− s) 1− lG
σ(1− (1− s)lG) + slw
1− β1 − 1cc
β11cc
− 1− β1
β1
1cG
1cc
s
σ + lw
σ(1− (1− s)lG) + slw ≡ T (σ) (17)
D = T − 1− θ(1− s) 1− lG
σ(1− (1− s)lG) + slw
1− β1
β11cc
≡ D (σ) (18)
Proof. See Appendix 7.3.
To apply the geometrical method developped by Grandmont et al. (1998), we choose
σ ≥ 0 as the bifurcation parameter. This choice is especially relevant regarding previous
11The dynamic path requires uic (wtlit, Gt) > βiRt+1uic (wt+1lit+1, Gt+1), for all i ≥ 2, which can be
ensured by a sufficiently low discount factor βi.
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contributions showing that endogenous fluctuations can occur in Ramsey models with
heterogeneous consumers (Becker and Foias (1987, 1994), Bosi and Seegmuller (2010a)).
A key result of this literature is that endogenous cycles require a low enough elasticity of
capital-labor substitution, allowing the capital income to decrease with respect to capital
(σ < (1− s)[1− β1(1− δ)]). Such a condition appears to be extremely restrictive and not
compatible with empirically realistic values for σ (see footnote 2).
Considering now the (T,D)-plane, following a variation of the elasticity of capital-
labor substitution σ, the locus Σ ≡ {(T (σ) , D (σ)) : σ ≥ 0} describes an (unconnected)
half-line, with endpoint:
T (+∞) = 1 + 1
β1
− 1− β1
β1
1cG
1cc
s
1− (1− s)lG (19)
D (+∞) = T (+∞)− 1 (20)
and a slope S = D′ (σ) /T ′ (σ) given by:
S =
θ(1− (1− s)lG)1cc + (1− β1)1cGslw
θ(1− (1− s)lG)(1cc − 1 + β1) + (1− β1)1cGslw (21)
To present our results using the geometrical method introduced by Grandmont et al.
(1998), we start by considering the case where the labor supply is inelastic with respect
to the wage, but still depends on public spending, i.e. lw = 0. Note that this implicitly
means that icc = 1 (see equation (11)). In a second step, we will generalize this analysis
to the case where the labor supply depends on the real wage.
By direct inspection of equations (17) and (18), we see that T (0) = ±∞ and D(0) =
±∞, depending on the slope S, which becomes:
S =
1cc
1cc − (1− β1) (22)
It follows that S is decreasing in 1cc, with S > 1 for all 1cc > 1 − β1, S ∈ (−∞, 0) for
1cc < 1 − β1 and S → 0 when 1cc → 0. As depicted in Figure 1, when 1cc decreases,
Σ makes a counterclockwise rotation around (T (+∞), D(+∞)), which is located on the
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(AC) line, becoming flat when 1cc → 0. Therefore, D(+∞) < 1 and D′(σ) < 0 are two
necessary conditions to get indeterminacy and Hopf bifurcation.
We have that D(+∞) < 1 if lG < 1/(1− s) and 1cG > min1cG , with:
min1cG ≡
1cc
s
[1− (1− s)lG] (23)
Taking into account that β1 is usually assumed to be close to 1, we have D(+∞) > −1
for reasonable levels of public spending externalities, i.e. 1cG < max1cG , with:
max1cG ≡
1 + β1
1− β1
1cc
s
[1− (1− s)lG] (24)
Using equation (18), we also get that when lw = 0 and lG < 1/(1− s), D′(σ) < 0 if and
only if lG > 1. Let us then assume:
Assumption 3. 1cG ∈ (min1cG , max1cG ) and lG ∈ (1, 1/(1− s)).
This means that public spending positively affects the marginal utility of consumption
for the patient agent and the impatient ones (see equation (11)), but this effect should
not be too large.
Let us define σH such that one crosses the segment [BC], σF such that one crosses the
line (AB), F1cc such that S = −1 and H1cc such that Σ goes through the point B.12 Using
our geometrical arguments and as drawn in Figure 1, we conclude that when 1cc > F1cc,
(T,D) is above (AB), (AC) and [BC] for σ < σH , crosses [BC] for σ = σH and is inside
ABC for σ > σH . When H1cc < 1cc < F1cc, (T,D) is on the left-side of (AB) for σ < σF ,
crosses (AB) for σ = σF , is above (AB), (AC) and [BC] for σF < σ < σH , crosses [BC]
for σ = σH and is inside ABC for σ > σH . Finally, when 1cc < H1cc, (T,D) is on the
left-side of (AB) for σ < σF , crosses (AB) for σ = σF and is inside ABC for σ > σF .
We then get the following Lemma:
12The critical values σH , σF , F1cc and H1cc are given in Appendix 7.4.
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Figure 1: Local indeterminacy when lw = 0
Lemma 2. Under Assumptions 1-3 and lw = 0, indeterminacy occurs if either 1cc > H1cc
and σ > σH , or 1cc < H1cc and σ > σF . Moreover, a Hopf bifurcation generically occurs
when σ crosses σH while a flip bifurcation generically occurs when when σ crosses σF .
Using these preliminary results, we generalize now our analysis to an elastic labor
supply with respect to the real wage, i.e. lw 6= 0. We consider the case lw = 0 as
a benchmark and analyze what changes when lw deviates from 0. We observe that the
endpoint (T (+∞), D(+∞)) does not depend on lw, i.e. stays on the (AC) line. Moreover,
using (21), we derive:
∂S
∂lw
< 0 and lim
lw→+∞
S = 1 (25)
Let ∗lw be defined by S = 0:
∗lw ≡ −
θ[1− (1− s)lG]1cc
(1− β1)1cGs < 0 (26)
Taking into account that lw ∈ (−1,+∞) and ∗lw can be larger than −1, we assume
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in the following that:
Assumption 4. lw > ∗lw.
First, this is satisfied if public spending externalities are not too large, i.e. 1cG < θ[1−
(1− s)lG]1cc/[s(1− β1)].13 Indeed, in this case, ∗lw < −1. Second, if this last inequality
is not fulfilled, lw > ∗lw is ensured by assuming that the elasticity of intertemporal
substitution in consumption of the impatient agents is not too low, which is in accordance
with the recent empirical evidence.14 Consider that all impatient agents are identical to
household i = 2. Using (11), we have lw = (1 − 2cc)/(2ll + 2cc). Therefore, lw > ∗lw
is equivalent to 2cc < (1 − ∗lw2ll)/(1 + ∗lw). Taking into account that the right-hand
side of this inequality is sufficiently high, in any case larger than 1, this requires that the
elasticity of intertemporal substitution in consumption 1/2cc should not be too weak.
Our strategy is to see what happens when lw deviates from 0, keeping the other pa-
rameters as given. Using (25), we immediately conclude that Σ makes a counterclockwise
rotation around (T (+∞), D(+∞)) when lw decreases from +∞ to ∗lw. More precisely, S
increases from 1 to +∞ and, then, from −∞ to 0. This means that we have either S > 1
or S < 0. Therefore, the geometrical configurations are similar to the preliminary case
where lw = 0, except that we will now classify them according to the value of lw (see
also Figure 2).
13Note that the right-hand side of this inequality is larger than min1cG .
14The elasticity of intertemporal substitution in consumption is usually assumed to be less than one.
However, the recent contributions provide divergent views. Mulligan [24], Vissing-Jorgensen [29] and
Vissing-Jorgensen and Attanasio [30] repeatedly obtained estimates of this elasticity which are signifi-
cantly larger than one. More recently, Gruber [15] and Kapoor and Ravi [17] provide robust estimates in
the range (2, 3).
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As a direct implication, two necessary conditions to get indeterminacy and Hopf bi-
furcation are D(+∞) < 1 and D′(σ) < 0. The first one is ensured by Assumption 3, while
the second condition is satisfied under Assumptions 3-4.
Let us define Flw such that S = −1 and Hlw such that Σ goes through the point B.
We can use the same geometrical arguments than in the case lw = 0 to get the results of
the following proposition (see also Figure 2). Note however that when lw 6= 0, T (0) and
D(0) take now finite values. Using (17) and (18), we can easily show that (T (0), D(0)) is
on the right-side of (AC) when lw < 0, whereas it is located above (AC) when lw > 0.
In this last case, the critical values σH and σF can be positive or negative depending on
parameter configurations.15
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Figure 2: Local indeterminacy when lw > ∗lw
15The critical values Flw, 
H
lw, σH and σF are given in Appendix 7.4.
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We then get the following Proposition:
Proposition 2. Under Assumptions 1-4, the following results generically hold:
(i) When lw > Flw, the steady state is unstable for σ < σH , undergoes a Hopf bifurcation
for σ = σH , and becomes locally indeterminate (stable) for σ > σH ;
(ii) When Hlw < lw < Flw, the steady state is a saddle for σ < σF , undergoes a flip
bifurcation for σ = σF , is unstable for σF < σ < σH , undergoes a Hopf bifurcation
for σ = σH , and becomes locally indeterminate (stable) for σ > σH ;
(iii) When ∗lw < lw < Hlw, the steady state is a saddle for σ < σF , undergoes a flip
bifurcation for σ = σF , and becomes locally indeterminate (stable) for σ > σF .
This proposition shows that endogenous business cycles emerge through Hopf or flip
bifurcations, leading to expectation-driven fluctuations for σ > max{σH , σF}. In contrast
to previous contributions focusing on Ramsey models with heterogeneous households,
endogenous fluctuations occur for a large range of elasticities of capital-labor substitution
including high values. This is at odds with the non monotonicity of capital income required
to get period-two cycles, in the model with neither endogenous labor, nor public spending
externalities (Becker and Foias (1987, 1994)). Note that this last condition can be slightly
relaxed when elastic labor is introduced (Bosi and Seegmuller (2010a)). However, in all
these papers, local indeterminacy and Hopf bifurcations are ruled out. Expectation-driven
fluctuations can be obtained if non-linear tax rates are introduced, but this still requires
a weak input substitutability (Bosi and Seegmuller (2010b)).
Let us emphasize that limit cycles occur for the more relevant parameter configura-
tions. If one considers as usual the discount factor β1 close to 1, reasonable or not too
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large values of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution in consumption 1/1cc and of
the wage elasticity of labor supply lw, configuration (i) of Proposition 2 is the most
relevant one.16 In this case, local indeterminacy occurs for σ > σH and endogenous cycles
appear through a Hopf bifurcation.
A numerical illustration: Let us consider a simple example in order to show that
our conditions for indeterminacy are compatible with plausible parameterizations of the
underlying economy. We consider the following fundamentals:
ui(ci, G) =
c
1−θi
i
1−θi G
γi , vi(li) = −B (¯`−li)1−χi1−χi and f(a) = A [ηa−ρ + 1− η]
−1/ρ
Beside agent 1, we assume that all the other agents i = 2, ..., H are identical. To fit
quarterly data, we set the depreciation rate of capital to δ = 0.025, the subjective
discount factors to β1 = 0.99, βi = 0.98, and the capital share of national income to
η = 0.3. Based on our reading of the recent empirical literature (see footnotes 5 and 14),
we consider the following parameters’ values: χ1 = 0.4, χi = 0.35, θ1 = 0.52, θi = 0.34.
Concerning the size of the public spending externality,17 we set γ1 = 0.55 and γi = 0.6905.
All the Assumptions are satisfied since γ1 > θ1, χi + θi < γi < (χi + θi)/(1 − η) and
θ1, θi < 1, and condition (12) of Corollary 1 holds. We derive that local indeterminacy
arises with complex roots for any elasticity of capital-labor substitution σ = 1/(1 + ρ)
within the interval [0.4, 3.24] of plausible values (see footnote 2).18
Previous contributions have already stressed the role of public spending on the oc-
16Indeed, we have 1cc > (1− β1)/2 and Flw < 0.
17Ni [25] provides estimates of a similar Cobb-Douglas utility function and shows that the parameter
γ lies in the interval (0.5, 0.8).
18Details of the numerical simulations are available upon request.
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currence of local indeterminacy, especially in models with representative agents. But, in
contrast to our result, deterministic cycles do not appear in the absence of productive
externalities. Actually, expectation-driven fluctuations occur if households’ utility dis-
plays increasing returns to scale in private consumption and public spending (Cazzavillan
(1996), Guo and Harrison (2008), Zhang (2000)). We can show that in our framework,
such a property is not necessary for all the agents.
If ui(ci, G) is homogeneous of degree µ, increasing returns mean that µ > 1, or equiv-
alently icG > icc. A first necessary condition for endogenous fluctuations when capital
and labor are substitutes is lG > 1. To simplify, if all impatient workers are similar to
household i = 2, this can be rewritten as 2cG > 2cc+2ll, which precisely ensures increas-
ing returns in utility for these agents. A second necessary condition is 1cG > min1cG . Since
lG > 1, we derive from (23) that min1cG < 1cc. Therefore, if 1cG belongs to (min1cG , 1cc),
indeterminacy is compatible with decreasing returns in the capitalist’s utility.
It is important to note that endogenous labor plays a crucial role for the existence of
expectation-driven fluctuations, through the link between labor supply and public spend-
ing. Indeed, without endogenous labor, we have lG = lw = 0, which implies that the
steady state cannot be indeterminate and Hopf bifurcations never occur.19 However, if
public spending externalities are large enough for workers (lG > 1), expectation-driven
fluctuations and endogenous business cycles occur under a weakly elastic or even inelastic
labor supply with respect to wage. This is in contrast to models with public spending ex-
ternalities and a representative consumer where an infinitely elastic labor supply is often
19Indeed, using our geometrical arguments, D′(σ) > 0 with S > 1 or S < 0 and D(0) = −∞, meaning
that Σ never enters ABC.
20
assumed (see for instance Guo and Harrison (2008)).
Let us finally examine how the two critical values σH and σF evolve according to the
elasticity of labor supply with respect to wage. Using the expressions found in Appendix
7.4, we observe that σH is increasing in lw if and only if 1cG < 1, while σF is increasing
in lw if and only if 1cG > 1cc(1 + β1)/(1 − β1). As seen above, for reasonable param-
eter values, σH seems to be the relevant bifurcation value above which indeterminacy
occurs. Therefore, if the public spending externality on capitalist’s utility is not too large
(1cG < 1), larger wage elasticities of workers’ labor supplies stabilize, reducing the range
of elasticities of input substitution for indeterminacy. In contrast, if the public spend-
ing externality on capitalist’s utility is sufficiently large (1cG > 1), we get the opposite
conclusion.
5 Economic intuition
In Ramsey models with heterogeneous households, the interpretation of cycles is usually
linked to the capitalist’s budget constraint. Indeed, fluctuations occur if the capital income
monotonicity fails, i.e. for sufficiently low degrees of capital-labor substitution (σ <
(1− s)[1−β1(1− δ)]) (see Becker and Foias (1987, 1994)). As mentioned previously, such
a condition appears to be extremely restrictive and thus not compatible with empirically
realistic values for σ.
In our framework, endogenous cycles also occur under a large elasticity of capital-labor
substitution, in particular such that σ > (1 − s)[1 − β1(1 − δ)]. Obviously, this means
that the standard mechanism based on the capitalist’s budget constraint does not allow
to generate fluctuations. But this also suggests that the explanation of expectation-driven
21
fluctuations actually relies on an alternative mechanism which is rather mainly based on
the Euler equation:
u1c(c1t, Gt)
u1c(c1t+1, Gt+1)
= β1Rt+1 (27)
with
Gt = τf(kt/lt)lt (28)
To simplify, let us focus on the case where the labor supply is inelastic with respect to the
wage rate (lw = 0). We derive from equation (11) that this case is obtained if icc = 1
for any i > 2.
Let households be optimistic and the capitalist deviates from the steady state by
investing more, i.e. kt+1 increases. This means that both current consumption c1t and
the return on capital Rt+1 decreases, but since capital and labor are high substitutes
(σ > (1− s)[1− β1(1− δ)]), the capitalist’s income Rt+1kt+1 increases in the next period.
This implies a raise of future consumption c1t+1. Therefore, for a constant level of public
spending, the right-hand side of equation (27) decreases, while the left-hand side increases
because of both the raise of c1t+1 and the lower c1t. This excludes self-fulfilling fluctuations.
However, considering the impact of public spending on the marginal utility of con-
sumption can yield an additional effect which mitigates the increase of the left-hand side.
It will also induce an increase of the return on capital.
Indeed, the rise of kt+1 now implies a variation of public spendingGt+1, which generates
an increase of the marginal utility of consumption at t + 1. As labor supply depends on
public spending, Gt can be rewritten as a function of capital. Using (28), we get:
Gk ≡ dG/G
dk/k
=
s
1− (1− s)lG (29)
Based on this expression, and considering that since lw = 0, we have dkt+1/k = dc1t+1/c1.
It follows that the marginal utility of consumption at t+ 1 increases if
1cGGk
dkt+1
k
− 1ccdc1t+1
c1
=
dkt+1
k
[
1cG
s
1− (1− s)lG − 1cc
]
> 0 (30)
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Using equation (23) we derive that this condition is equivalent to 1cG > min1cG . Recall then
from Proposition 2 that this is a necessary condition to have endogenous business cycles
when σ is large enough. This ensures that the increase of the left-hand side of equation
(27), due to a lower c1t, is mitigated.
The second important point is to notice that under 1 < lG < 1/(1−s), we have lk > 1
(see equation (14)).20 This means that the capital-labor ratio decreases with respect to k.
Therefore, following an increase of kt+1, the return on capital Rt+1 raises, slightly when
capital and labor are sufficiently substitutable. Therefore, the rise of kt+1 now implies an
increase of both the left and right-hand side of equation (27) so that the expectations are
self-fulfilling.
Note that this intuition stresses the important role played by the labor market, since
it allows the return of capital to increase with capital. The role of the labor market
on the occurrence of indeterminacy is however different from most one-sector models
with a representative household. Indeed, in our framework with many agents, impatient
workers make a static trade-off between consumption and leisure, because of their binding
borrowing constraints. Therefore, labor supply does not depend on expectations on future
prices.
6 Conclusion
Public spending is introduced in the Ramsey model with heterogeneous households de-
veloped by Becker (1980) and recently extended to endogenous labor by Bosi and Seeg-
muller (2010a). They are financed through a linear taxation on income and positively
20We thank a referee to underline this point.
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affect households’ welfare. The existence of such an externality is a source of endogenous
business cycles. Indeed, in contrast to previous contributions focusing on Ramsey models
with heterogeneous agents, endogenous fluctuations emerge for large enough degrees of
capital-labor substitution. Another new contribution to this literature is that endoge-
nous cycles occur around the steady state through a Hopf bifurcation, underlying the
persistence of fluctuations. Finally, in contrast to models with a representative agent,
when heterogeneous households are considered, endogenous business cycles do not require
productive externalities and are in accordance with a weakly elastic labor supply with
respect to the wage rate.
7 Appendix
7.1 Proof of Proposition 1
The proof of this proposition consists in three steps.
Step 1. For i = 1, (S2)-(S5) satisfy the optimality conditions in Definition 1.
Moreover, since c1, k1 and G are constant and 0 < β1 < 1, the transversality condition
limt→+∞ βt1u1c (c1, G) k1 = 0 holds.
Step 2. For i ≥ 2, given G, consider the feasible sequence
(
k˜it, l˜it, c˜it
)
, starting from
k˜i0 = 0. We now compare this path with the stationary solution (ci, li), such that ki = 0,
1 > li > 0 and ci = (1− τ)wli, and show that the stationary solution is optimal.
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+∞∑
t=0
βti
[
ui (ci, G)− vi (li)−
(
ui (c˜it, G)− vi
(
l˜it
))]
≥
+∞∑
t=0
βti
[
uic ((1− τ)wli, G) ((1− τ)wli − c˜it)− v′i (li)
(
li − l˜it
)]
= uic ((1− τ)wli, G) lim
T→+∞
[
βTi k˜iT+1 + (1/βi − 1/β1)
T∑
t=1
βti k˜it − k˜i0/β1
]
≥ −uic ((1− τ)wli, G) k˜i0/β1 = 0
Step 3. Under Assumption 2, there is a unique finite and strictly positive value of a
such that R(a) = 1− δ + (1− τ)f ′ (a) = 1/β1. We further note that:
1. If R > 1/β1, then it is optimal for the most patient household to increase capital.
This cannot be a stationary solution because of decreasing returns in capital.
2. If R < 1/β1 < 1/β2 ≤ . . . ≤ 1/βH , each household decumulates to zero. Since l > 0,
at tends to 0 and f ′ (at) to +∞, violating stationarity.
7.2 Proof of Corollary 1
Using G = τf(a)l, the aggregate labor supply is given by l = l1 +
∑H
i=2 li(w, τf(a)l). This
implicitly defines l = l(l1), with:
dl
dl1
=
1
1− lG (31)
Consider now household i = 1. At a steady state, his consumption is given by:
c1 = (1/β1 − 1) k1 + (1− τ)wl1 = (1− τ)wl1 + (1/β1 − 1) al(l1) ≡ c1(l1)
Then l1 = 0 is a stationary solution iff liml1→0 ψ (l1) ≥ 0, with:
ψ (l1) ≡ v′1 (l1)− u1c [c1(l1), τf(a)l(l1)] (1− τ)w
7.3 Proof of Lemma 1
Linearizing the dynamic system (15)-(16) around the steady state, we obtain:
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dkt+1
k
=
1
β1
[
1− θ1− s
σ
(1− lk)
]
dkt
k
− 1− β1
β1
dc1t
c1
dc1t+1
c1
=
{
−1cG
1cc
(s+ (1− s)lk) + 1
β1
(
1− θ1− s
σ
(1− lk)
)
1
1cc[
1cG(s+ (1− s)lk)− θ1− s
σ
(1− lk)
]}
dkt
k
+
{
1− 1− β1
β11cc
[
1cG(s+ (1− s)lk)− θ1− s
σ
(1− lk)
]}
dc1t
c1
Since T and D represent respectively the trace and the determinant of the associated
Jacobian matrix, we get:
T = 1 +
1
β1
+ θ
1− s
σ
(1− lk)
(
1− β1
β11cc
− 1
β1
)
− 1− β1
β1
1cG
1cc
(s+ (1− s)lk)
D = T − 1− θ1− s
σ
(1− lk)1− β1
β11cc
Substituting lk given by equation (14) in these two expressions, the result follows.
7.4 Critical values
Critical values σF and σH
The critical value σH solves D(σH) = 1:
σH =
θ(1− s)(lG − 1)1cc + s(1− β1)(1cc − 1cG)lw
(1− β1)s(1cG − min1cG )
(32)
The critical value σF solves 1 + T (σF ) +D(σF ) = 0:
σF =
θ(1− s)(lG − 1)(1− β1 − 21cc) + 2slw[(1− β1)1cG − (1 + β1)1cc]
2(1− β1)s(max1cG − 1cG)
(33)
Critical values Flw and 
H
lw
The critical value Flw solves S = −1:
Flw =
θ(1− (1− s)lG)(1− β1 − 21cc)
2s(1− β1)1cG (34)
The critical value Hlw solves σH = σF or, equivalently, S =
1−D(+∞)
−2−T (+∞) :
Hlw =
θ(1− s)(lG − 1)[21cc(max1cG − min1cG )− (1− β1)(1cG − min1cG )]
2s[(1cG − min1cG )(1− β1 − (1 + β1)1cc) + (1cG − 1)(1− β1)(max1cG − min1cG )]
(35)
Note that when lw = 0, S = −1 for F1cc = 1−β12 and σH = σF for H1cc =
(1−β1)2
8β1
[√
1 + 161cGsβ1
(1−β1)2(1−(1−s)lG) − 1
]
.
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